Abstract
Excerpted From: Matthew Poliakoff, Disentangling Race and Politics: Racial Gerrymandering in South Carolina's First Congressional District, 19 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar 56 (April 4, 2024) (135 Footnotes) (Full Document)
In November 2018, South Carolina's First Congressional District (“CD-1”) elected a Democratic representative for the first time since 1980 in a “major political upset.” The district then became a significant target of the National Republican Congressional Committee's campaigning efforts to reclaim seats lost in 2018. In 2020, the Republican candidate prevailed, setting the stage for a new cycle of redistricting initiated by the decennial census. The boundaries of CD-1 would become contentious in the Republican-controlled South Carolina state legislature's subsequent redistricting process. The state legislature's plan shored up Republican support in the district by adjusting the lines and shifting nearly two-hundred thousand people between CD-1 and nearby CD-6. The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP noted that thirty thousand of the residents moved from CD-1 to CD-6 were Black, and it filed suit on the grounds that the new plan for CD-1 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments' Equal Protection Clauses. This commentary analyzes the issues and implications of the Supreme Court's review of the lower court's finding that race was the predominant factor in CD-1's design, constituting an illegal racial gerrymander. It concludes that the Court should affirm the district court's findings based on the deferential clear error standard of review and discusses how a reversal may negatively impact future plaintiffs' ability to bring racial gerrymandering cases.
[. . .]
Alexander remains a case narrowed to a specific set of facts in a specific congressional district. The Court's decision is highly unlikely to buck the existing law derived from Shaw and its successor cases. Neither party has expressed desire in this case to alter the general principle that race may not be the predominant factor in redistricting decisions unless it survives strict scrutiny. The decision, however, would be deeply consequential for similar claims going forward. If the Court applies the clear error standard and still reverses the district court on the grounds that the circumstantial evidence in this case was insufficient to support even a plausible finding in favor of the plaintiffs, the bar to prove the predomination of race in future claims will be extraordinarily high. Advanced technological tools, like those employed by Dr. Ragusa on behalf of the plaintiffs, would be sidelined despite their clear usefulness in these cases. A reversal would further heighten an already “demanding” burden for plaintiffs.
On the other hand, an affirmation would help guarantee that future plaintiffs retain the necessary tools to prevail on these claims, without having to cite a rare admission of use of race by those redistricting. The Court has an opportunity in Alexander to clarify the law by adding detail to the methods and extent to which race must be disentangled from politics. One example would be the clear rejection of an alternative map requirement, an idea to which several justices were sympathetic during oral arguments. A more crucial example includes upholding the use of in-depth computer modeling that helps determine if people of a certain race are being sifted under the label of “partisan” sorting.
Ultimately, the voters of South Carolina's First and Sixth Congressional Districts are the most important stakeholders in this case. A reversal would represent a blow to the protection of their voting rights and further dilution of their choice of representation.
Duke University School of Law, J.D., 2025. University of Virginia, B.A., 2020.
